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The law imposes a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of professional advice 
and treatment on all health practitioners, which in Australia is assessed via a modified Bolam 
principle. In an era of medical dominance this standard was clearly related to the standards of the 
medical profession. However, the evolving nature of the Australian health workforce has fuelled 
speculation as to how non-medical professions are assessed to be practising in accordance with 
established standards. This article explores the peer-professional defence in relation to new, emerging 
and established non-medical professions practising in areas that were not historically part of their 
remit, and finds that individual health professions – even those who do not possess traits historically 
defined by professionalism - have ultimate discretion in determining the standards by which they are 







The law imposes a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of professional advice 
and treatment on all health practitioners1. The standard by which such reasonable care and skill has 
been measured in recent times was against the Bolam principle, from the English case Bolam v Friern 
Barnet Hospital Management Committee2, which placed primacy of importance on the accepted 
nature of treatment within the medical profession. This was explained in Sidaway v Governors of the 
Bethlehem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital3: 
 
“A doctor is not negligent if her acts in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as 
proper by a responsible body of medical opinion even though other doctors adopt a different 
practice. In short, the law imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter of 
clinical judgment.”4 
 
In Roger v Whittaker5 the Australian courts confirmed their rejection of the Bolam principle in 
determining the standard of care, at least in giving advice or information, meaning that professional 
standards were influential – though not conclusive – in determining whether the a professional 
standard was relevant, instead stating that this was a matter for the court. This ‘half-rejection’ was 
explained in more detail by Gleeson CJ in the case Rosenberg v Percival6: 
 
“… the relevance of professional practice and opinion was not denied; what was denied was 
its conclusiveness. In many cases, professional practice and opinion will be the primary, and 
in some cases it may be the only, basis upon which a court may reasonably act. But, in an 
action brought by a patient, the responsibility for deciding the content of the doctor’s duty of 
care rests with the court, not with his or her professional colleagues”. 
 
In 2002, building upon the effects of Roger v Whittaker and the subsequent ‘unsustainable’ award of 
damages in public liability cases, a ministerial meeting on public liability comprising Commonwealth, 
State and Territory ministers was convened, and agreed to appoint a panel of persons to examine and 
review the Australian law of negligence7. This review, the Review of the Law of Negligence was 
commonly referred to as the Ipp Report (hereafter referred to as Ipp). A core recommendation of Ipp 
was the recommendation concerning the standard of care in treatment cases (Recommendation 3): 
 
“… [T]he test for determining the standard of care in cases in which a medical practitioner is 
alleged to have been negligent in providing treatment to a patient should be: A medical 
practitioner is not negligent if the treatment provided was in accordance with an opinion 
widely held by a significant number of respected practitioners in the field, unless the Court 
considers that the opinion was irrational.”8 
 
                                                 
1 This is most clearly demonstrated by provisions for registered practitioners under the Health Practitioner 
National Law Act 2009 (Qld) and its adopted variants across other States and Territories as part of the National 
Registration and Accreditation System. However, there are also provisions in civil and criminal law for all 
practitioners, and even legislative provisions such as ‘negative licensing’ or statutory code of conduct legislation 
as enacted under section 41A of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW). See Wardle J, “Holding 
unregistered health practitioners to account: an analysis of current regulatory and legislative approaches” (2014) 
22 JLM 350 
2 [1957] 1 WLR 582 
3 [1985] AC 871 
4 [1985] AC 871 at [881] 
5 [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 
6 [2001] HCA 18 at [7] 
7 Panel for the Review of the Law of Negligence, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2002)  




By providing the exception to the peer professional defence, Ipp highlights that the peer professional 
opinion defence is influential in determining negligence, but cannot be viewed (as in Bolam) as a sole 
defence in-and-of itself. Madden and McIlwraith describe the post-Ipp framework as having three 
steps: 1) common law, as adjusted by civil liability provisions considers whether the practitioner has 
been negligent; 2) the statutory ‘peer professional opinion’ defence allows for consideration of 
whether the health professional acted in a manner that was widely deemed to be competent 
professional practice, and; 3) the exception to the defence (“unless the court considers that opinion 
irrational”) allows for treatment that is irrational or unreasonable to not be considered competent 
practice, simply by virtue of wide professional acceptance9. This recommendation was eventually 
enacted, in various and subtly different forms, by State governments in Australia10. However, a 
number of issues have arisen from the ways in which this recommendation has been enacted. For 
example, there is little consideration of what the terms ‘significant’, ‘professional’, ‘competent’ or 
‘respected’ may mean. Additionally, in their implementation, State governments had not provided 
clarity on the health professionals to whom these provisions applied in the legislation.  
 
The changing nature of the Australian health workforce 
 
Beyond issues of (relatively) more legal clarity such as breach of duty, Madden and McIlwraith 
highlight that the issue of what constitutes competent or accepted practice remains speculative, and 
requires further development of law in this area11. Fuelling such speculation is the fact there has been 
increased scope expansion across the health practitioner spectrum. The Australian health workforce is 
rapidly changing to meet the evolving needs of contemporary health system and health consumers. 
Task substitution and task delegation has now become a focus of Australian health policy and health 
workforce planning12, and it has also been proposed that health practitioners need to work towards the 
“top of their licence” by performing health tasks that, whilst legally and technically allowable, were 
not previously part of standard practice13. Task substitution proposed by Australian government 
reports have been for high-level tasks once restricted to medical practitioners, including reporting 
pathology and X-rays (scientists and medical imaging technologists replacing pathologists and 
radiologists), administering anaesthesia (nurse anaesthetists replacing anaesthetists) and laryngoscopy 
(speech pathologists replacing ENT surgeons). Some commentators have already noted that such task 
substitution is likely to have significant impact on professional liability14. It is also likely that such 
delegation and substitution will have significant effect on what constitutes both competent and 
accepted practice, as health professions begin to take on roles once reserved, monopolised or 
restricted to other professional groups.  
 
However, such task substitution is not always directed by health policy concerns, nor directed by 
government. Within established professions too, there has also been much voluntary change in what 
constitutes normal ‘scope of practice’. The increasing number of dieticians entering unsupervised 
private practice in one-on-one clinical settings15, for example, may negate previous arguments that 
dieticians did not require statutory regulation as their profession was focused on hospital practice 
under the supervision of regulated health practitioners. Growing specialisation and utilisation of niche 
health professions has also had significant impact on the way in which healthcare is delivered. For 
                                                 
9 Madden B and McIlwraith J, Australian Medical Liability (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2013) 
p135 
10 It was not enacted by Territory governments 
11 Madden and McIwraith, n at 135 
12 Duckett S, “Interventions to facilitate health workforce restructure” (2005) 2 Aust New Zealand Health Policy 
14 
13 Murray RB, “Do available predictions of future medical workforce requirements provide a sensible basis for 
planning? No” (2012) 197 Med J Aust 267 
14 Keany M, “Health workforce redesign in Australia: implications for health care professional liability and the 
provision of professional indemnity insurance” (2008) 15 JLM 494 





example, increased specialisation in mental health care has resulted not only in psychiatry and 
psychology entering new fields of practice, but also in the emergence of multiple mental health 
disciplines practising (and increasingly integrated) in the arena once monopolised by psychology and 
psychiatry, many of whom may themselves fulfil the current criteria for future inclusion in a 
regulatory scheme16. Unlike government supported scope expansion or task substitution, which may 
bring with it protective legislative arrangements for this increased scope17, this voluntary scope 
expansion brings no such protections, and the responsibilities, standards and duties associated with 
such action remain unclear. Additionally, although scope expansion may be traditionally viewed as 
being directed by governments or institutions to improve efficiency18, an increasingly consumerist 
model of healthcare has given the consumer greater power in shaping the way healthcare is delivered. 
One clear example of this phenomenon of this is the rise of complementary health services19, which 
now account for half the health practitioner numbers providing primary point-of-care service, half the 
total health consultations and half of all out-of-pocket health spend in Australia20. However, whilst it 
is estimated that one-third of Australian patients who seek the services of a complementary medicine 
provider now utilise this therapist as their primary care practitioner21, there has been scant 
examination of what this emerging yet significant scope of practice means from a medico-legal 
perspective. 
 
In addition to scope expansion amongst established health occupations – which could reasonably be 
considered health ‘professionals’ even under the older criteria – in some instances cost and 
productivity initiatives have necessitated that work previously done by highly-trained and regulated 
workforces has been replaced by lower cost unregistered providers (such as the administration of 
scheduled medicines by carers rather than medical practitioners or registered nurses)22. Additionally, 
as the Australian health system evolves new health disciplines may develop, which may develop an 
established role before they are fully incorporated into statutory regulatory arrangements23. The 
                                                 
16 Freckelton I, “Trends in Regulation of Mental Health Practitioners” (2008) 15 Psychiatr Psychol Law 415 
17 For example, see the government temporary arrangements to provide independent midwifery professional 
indemnity insurance. See Forrester K, “Nurses, midwives and the requirement for “appropriate” professional 
indemnity insurance” (2012) 19 JLM 678 
18 Most procedural examples of task delegation would fit this example – e.g. the transfer of foot surgery to 
podiatric surgeons 
19 Another example is the fitness and wellness coach industry, which has been discussed in Keyzer P, Coyle I, 
Dietrich J et al, “Legal risk management and injury in the fitness industry: the outcomes of focus group research 
and a national survey of fitness professionals” (2014) 21 JLM 826 
20 See Xue C, Zhang A, Lin V, et al, “Complementary and alternative medicine use in Australia: a national 
population-based survey” (2007) 13 J Altern Complement Med 643 for data which suggests patient out-of-
pocket costs and number of consultations with complementary medicine providers are now comparable to those 
of conventional medical products and conventional medical providers. See also Wardle J, Adams J, Soares 
Magalhães R and Sibbritt D, “Distribution of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) providers in rural 
New South Wales, Australia: a step towards explaining high CAM use in rural health?’ (2011) 19 Aust J Rural 
Health 197 for data which suggests that in some areas of Australia complementary health providers offering 
primary care services to patients may in fact outnumber conventional primary care providers. 
21 For evidence of this trend See Chow R, “Complementary medicine: impact on medical practice” (2000) 41 
Curr Ther 76; Grace S, Vemulpad S and Beirman R, “Training in and use of diagnostic techniques among CAM 
practitioners: an Australian study” (2006) 12 J Altern Complement Med 695. Like other professions such as 
nursing, this primary care role seems particularly pronounced in rural areas. See Wardle J, Adams J and Lui C, 
“A qualitative study of naturopathy in rural practice: A focus upon naturopaths' experiences and perceptions of 
rural patients and demands for their services” (2010) 10 BMC Health Serv Res 185 
22 The use of unregistered assistants-in-nursing and personal care attendants to perform tasks that were once the 
domain of enrolled and registered nurses is one example, as is the increasing use of counsellors and 
psychotherapists in place of psychologists. See Australian Nursing Federation, Balancing risk and safety for our 
community: unlicensed health workers in the health and aged care systems (Australian Nursing Federation, 
Canberra, 2009) p 3. 
23 For an example of such a profession, see the discussion around training and regulatory requirements for the 
Physician Assistant workforce in Health Workforce Australia, The potential role of Physician Assistants in the 




increasingly multidisciplinary nature of Australian healthcare delivery has also necessitated the 
development of new health disciplines and increased roles for nascent health disciplines, for whom 
regulatory structures and legislative arrangements will need to be considered, but for whom there has 
been little policy, legislative or regulatory attention. This also includes the increased 
professionalization and integration of “professional assistants” into healthcare in Australia and 
internationally24, with some of these “professional assistants”, such as physician assistants, being 
actively promoted by Australian government to fill primary care gaps in underserved communities25. 
It is estimated that over 200,000 unregistered health practitioners are providing health services in 
Australia26, however, as unregistered health practitioners existing outside formal regulatory structures 
it is difficult to estimate the true size of the sector27. 
 
Most attention in medical liability has, understandably, focused on the medical profession, and 
therefore in the few cases where such questions have been raised28 they’ve been answered in relation 
to this profession. In other well-established professions, such as nursing or dentistry, this may be also 
relatively clear29. However, when existing professions expand their scope of practice beyond 
traditional roles and start performing roles previously restricted to other practitioner groups30, these 
provisions become much less clear. Additionally, for new and emerging professions, including the 
rise of ‘unorthodox’ complementary and alternative therapists in Australia, these standards are less 
clear. Although medical opinion was historically a significant influence on non-medical health 
professional practice this too appears to be waning, with scope expansion of some practitioners31 and 
inclusion of some practitioners into national registration scheme32 occurring even when there is 
significant opposition from the medical community. Previous rules, assumptions and protocols for 
considering what constitutes a health profession or professional practice within a health profession 
may no longer be relevant to changes in Australian civil liability law. In order to examine the impact 
of scope expansion, task substitution and emerging roles of new provider types on the peer 
professional opinion defence in medical litigation two primary questions need to be answered. 
Initially, it must be determined which health occupations current civil liability provisions relating to 
medical negligence extend to. Once it has been determined, it needs to be considered what the 
standards of peer professional opinion must be. 
 
Who are the professionals? 
                                                 
24 Edmond N, Arada K and Gaudoin R, “The ‘assistant practitioner’ as ‘associate professional’? Professional 
development of intermediate roles in health and social care and education” (2012) 34 Stud Cont Educ 45 
25 Kurti L, Rudland S, Wilkinson R, et al “Physician’s assistants: a workforce solution for Australia?” (2011) 17 
Aust J Prim Health 23 
26 Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Committee, Final report: Options for regulation of unregistered health 
practitioners (Australian Health Minister’s Advisory Council, Adelaide, 2013) p 60 
27 Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Committee, n 26, at 60. For one profession alone, naturopathy, 
estimates range from 3,000 to 15,000 practitioners, though most indicating a practice population of at least 
10,000. Similar variation in estimated practitioner populations was observed across many other (though usually 
smaller) health disciplines. Examples of such practitioners include arts therapists, assistants-in-nursing, 
audiologists, counsellors and psychotherapists, dental technicians and oral health technicians, diabetes 
educators, dietitians, music therapists, perfusionists, social workers and speech pathologists. These practitioners 
are currently employed in government health schemes, hospitals and in many instances attract Medicare 
subsidies or other government subsidies for their private services. Some unregistered health practitioners are 
even entrenched in legislation, for example various pieces of Australian legislation (such as legislation 
governing adoption or requirements upon receiving a positive HIV test) specifically require a person seek 
counselling services. 
28 For example, in the Ipp Report 
29 For example, there are national competency standards in these professions. 
30 For example, nurse physicians taking on primary care roles 
31 Such as the attempts to allow for increased scope of nurse practitioners, for pharmacists to administer 
vaccinations and for optometrists to perform tasks once restricted to ophthalmologists. 
32 For example, Chinese medicine. For further detail on the perceptions of the Australian medical community to 
Chinese medicine see Wardle J; Sibbritt D; Adams J, “Referral patterns to Chinese medicine practitioners by 





A key issue in determining the standards that are applied in determination of medical negligence via 
the departure of professional standards in the post-Ipp, a key consideration is who is the professional 
group? Further complicating the definition of reasonable or competent standards of practice for health 
professions is the emerging trend of health legislation that no longer limits discussion of ‘professions’ 
to application to medical practitioners – to whom Bolam almost exclusively applied – and 
encompasses a broad range of practitioners. In fact most legislation does not limit itself to any specific 
practitioner subtypes. In New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania no attempt at all is made to 
define what a health ‘professional’ is33. Queensland and Victoria only extend this definition to ‘a 
person practicing a profession’34. Western Australian legislation makes an attempt to define the 
specific groups that can be considered ‘health professionals’, but then, under Section 5PA(b) includes 
‘any person who practises a discipline or profession in the health area that involves the application of 
a body of learning’35. The professionalization movement has long been criticised as a political 
movement for professional promotion through extension of power, monopoly and influence, rather 
than one of public safety36. Additionally, many of the attributes of recognised health professions are 
no longer unique to those few professions which do manage to achieve formal recognition of their 
professional status, and are often shared by disciplines without this status37. The Ipp Committee 
acknowledged the political nature of this designation, and in fact deliberately opted out of making a 
formal suggestion or recommendation as to what occupational groups should constitute a profession 
for the purposes of medical litigation, noting that it was a political decision for governments to make 
or for courts to determine38. The Ipp Committee was, however, able to make a clearer statement on the 
use of the word ‘respected’, which it stated was to be used primarily “to ensure that the 
Commonwealth government has made attempt to define professionals under the Australian and New 
Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations – which is meant to inform how definitions are used 
in legislation – and defines professionals for this purpose rather broadly: 
 
“Professionals perform analytical, conceptual and creative tasks through the application of 
theoretical knowledge and experience in the fields of the arts, media, business, design, 
engineering, the physical and life sciences, transport, education, health, information and 
communication technology, the law, social sciences and social welfare”39.  
 
The declining importance of statutory registration in determining health professional status 
 
This broad definition has occurred as the changing nature of the Australian health landscape has 
resulted in more health practitioner types practising as part of the healthcare milieu than ever before. 
The nature of existing regulatory arrangements informing definition as a ‘professional’ has also 
changed considerably. The health practitioner sector regulatory regime in Australia began to liberalise 
in the 1990s as part of the Competition Review which arose out of the Hilmer Report40, which 
recommended the review of state-based legislation (including health practitioner legislation) to avoid 
                                                 
33 Madden and McIwraith, n 9 at 145 
34 Madden and McIwraith, n 9 at 145 
35 Madden and McIwraith, n 9 at 145 
36 Kerridge I, Lowe M and Stewart C, “Professionalism” in Ethics and Law for the Professions (3rd ed, 
Federation Press, Sydney, 2009), Ch 7, pp112-130; Wear D and Kuczewski M, “The professionalism 
movement: can we pause?” (2005) 4 Am J Bioethics 1 
37 For example, dietitians although do not have registration but have a distinct body of learning delivered by 
accredited education programs, government reimbursement for the services and are often employed in senior 
decision-making roles in the public health sector 
38 Panel for the Review of the Law of Negligence, n 7 at [3.25-3.31] p43 
39 See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations, cat 
no. 1220.0, version 1.2 (26 June 2013) 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/allprimarymainfeatures/4AF138F6DB4FFD4BCA2571E200096
BAD?opendocument   
40 National Competition Policy Review Committee The Report of the Independent Committee of Inquiry into 




anti-competitive provisions. This review resulted in a gradual retreat strictly defined scope of practice 
provisions that had been previously been employed to establish professional monopolies for 
professional advantage and advancement – and in the process unequivocally cemented that 
occupation’s professional status – and moved towards a greater reliance on ‘holding out’ provisions 
via protection of professional titles. This contemporary policy construction of health practitioner 
regulation as a process of risk management and protection of public safety, and efforts to reduce its 
use as a tool for developing professional monopolies, is quite different from sociological perspectives 
which have generally theorised statutory regulation as the state’s legitimation and protection of the 
profession’s work (and subsequently their ‘recognition’ as a profession). These developments have 
resulted in Australian jurisdictions taking a conservative approach to extending statutory regulation to 
new health disciplines, and despite increasing scope and prevalence of unregistered health 
practitioners in the Australian health system – which in the past may have been enough to warrant 
professional recognition through registration41 – only a few health disciplines have been formally 
considered for statutory registration from this time42.  
 
Increasingly health occupations have not undergone the traditional pathways of professionalization – 
such as the development and enforcement of practice and entry standards, statutory or voluntary. In 
fact, a considerable percentage of the total health workforce in Australia now functions in an 
environment not governed by any form of regulation – the traditional marker of ‘entry’ into formal 
recognition of professional status43 – save that of voluntary (and often ad-hoc and informal) self-
regulation44. However, reliance on registration status alone to identify which health disciplines are 
‘professions’ is itself fraught, as the issue of health professions registration is often highly 
controversial and highly politicised45. Registered status may also not be permanent: with the 
introduction of the legislation relating to mutual recognition of registered health practitioners across 
                                                 
41 The recognition of chiropractors serves as an example here. The first legislation recognising chiropractic in 
Australia (the Chiropractors Act 1964) arose from acknowledgement of the potential role of chiropractic in 
filling a gap that current medical care did not provide. This acknowledgement was determined in: Guthrie H 
(Chair) The Report of the Honorary Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the provisions of the Natural 
Therapists Bill (Western Australian Government, Perth, 1961). Naturopaths, homeopaths and osteopaths were 
also considered for registration and rejected solely because their scope of practice was not deemed to be valid or 
unique, and most aspects were ‘amply covered by currently registered professionals (medicine)’. A similar 
approach was taken by Webb E (Chair) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Chiropractic, Osteopathy, 
Homeopathy and Naturopathy (Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra 1977). In this report 
registration of chiropractic and osteopathy were recommended as recognition and reward for the increased 
standards these professions had developed in the past decade. Naturopathy and homeopathy were not deemed to 
have made the same progress and as such were dismissed. 
42 Aboriginal and Torres Strait health workers, Chinese medicine practitioners, medical radiation therapists and 
occupational therapists are now part of the National Scheme, with paramedics currently being mooted for 
inclusion. Naturopaths and Western herbalists have also been formally assessed by the Victorian government as 
requiring statutory registration, but are not included in the National Scheme.  
43 Kerridge et al, n 36 at 117 
44 Freckelton I, “Regulating the unregistered” (2008) 16 JLM 413 
45 As an example, the only currently unregistered health disciplines (naturopaths and Western herbalists and 
counsellors and psychotherapists) that have undergone a formal government-commissioned assessment was put 
forward to the Australian Health Workforce Ministerial Council in 2008 has had consideration delayed until 
negative licensing has been implemented nationally; whilst the only unregistered health discipline formally 
being considered (paramedics) was unilaterally put forward for inclusion by the Western Australian health 
minister in 2010, before a formal assessment against intergovernmental criteria had been made. See Lin V, 
Bensoussan A, Myers S, McCabe P, Cohen M, Hill S and Howse G, The practice and regulatory requirements 
of naturopathy and western herbal medicine (La Trobe School of Public Health (funded by Department of 
Human Services), Melbourne, 2005) p 14; Social Development Committee, Inquiry into Bogus, Unregistered 
and Deregistered Health Practitioners (Parliament of South Australia, Adelaide, 2009) p 1; Australian Health 






State and Territory boundaries in Australia in 1992–9346, statutory registration arrangements were 
repealed for some health disciplines that were registered in only some jurisdictions47, and were not 
reintroduced. Registered status may also have little relation to the role or integration of health 
disciplines within the broader health system: many health disciplines48 that have integrated into the 
conventional healthcare system via hospital placements or public subsidies for their services have not 
yet been included in the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme (the National Scheme – 
empowered by the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld), and its equivalent in 
other States and Territories), with no formal plans for their future inclusion49. Nor does registration 
status suggest that registered professions have undergone the process of professionalization (as it once 
did): Some health professions – such as aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health workers – have 
been accepted for inclusion into the national registration scheme before standards of training and 
practice had even been developed for that profession. In this view, although statutory registration of 
health professionals may list the protection of the health and safety of the public as its primary 
concern50, it would appear that it is to longer sufficient to use to identify professions to which such 
legislative provisions entail.  
 
Traits-based criteria for professional status 
 
Sappideen notes that, in addition to registration status, courts have traditionally adopted a ‘traits-
based’ definition of determining which occupations should and should not be accepted as a profession, 
whereby individual occupations are assessed by their essential attributes51. Whilst she also notes that 
there is no universal agreement on what these attributes are, Sappideen highlights “professional 
standards of competence, training and ethics... reinforced by some form of official accreditation 
accompanied by evidence of qualification”52 as being the primary requirement traditionally held by 
courts, whilst the academic literature on professions – which seems also to have influenced court 
                                                 
46 Under the Mutual Recognition Act 1992 (Cth) 
47 This included naturopaths, speech pathologists and social workers in the Northern Territory under the Health 
Practitioners and Allied Professions Act 1985 (NT) and dietitians in Victoria under the Dietitians Act 1981 
(Vic). 
48 Due to the heterogeneity of unregistered health practices, which range from those performed by well-
established long-standing professions with thousands of practitioners integrated into the Australian health 
system to small non-organised groupings of ‘fringe-medicine’ service providers, the term ‘health discipline’ and 
‘health practitioner’ has been used when describing unregistered health practitioner groups and practitioners. 
49 See Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council, n 1, p 10. Examples of such practitioners include arts 
therapists, assistants-in-nursing, audiologists, counsellors and psychotherapists, dental technicians and oral 
health technicians, diabetes educators, dietitians, music therapists, perfusionists, social workers and speech 
pathologists. These practitioners are currently employed in government health schemes, hospitals and in many 
instances attract Medicare subsidies or other government subsidies for their private services. Some unregistered 
health practitioners are even entrenched in legislation, for example various pieces of Australian legislation (such 
as legislation governing adoption or requirements upon receiving a positive HIV test) specifically require a 
person seek counselling services. 
50 though this remains the stated aim of registration legislation in Australia, analysis and commentary has 
questioned whether registration in Australia actually fulfils this promise, or whether it is still largely focused on 
professional protection and promotion. See Elkin K, “Medical practitioner regulation: is it all about protecting 
the public?” (2014) 21 JLM 682 
51 Sappideen C, “Bolam in Australia: more bark than bite?” (2010) 33 UNSW LJ 394 
52 Sappideen C, n 51 cites the following court cases that have instilled these definitions: Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue v Maxse [1919] 1 KB 647, 657 (Scrutton LJ); Currie v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
[1921] 2 KB 332; Robbins Herbal Instiute v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1923) 32 CLR 457; Carr v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners [1944] 2 All ER 163, 166 (Du Parcq LJ); Holman v Deol [1979] 1 NSWLR 640, 
649; NRMA v John Fairfax [2002] NSWSC 563 (26 June 2002), [147]; GIO General Ltd v Newcastle City 
Council (1996) 38 NSWLR 558, 568; Prestia v Aknar (1996) 40 NSWLR 165, 184–6 (Santow J); King v Besser 
[2002] VSC 354 (30 August 2002); Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 168 FCR 46, 93 
(Jessup J reviewing the authorities). Also adopting a traits based analysis, see Walmesley S, Abadee A and 
Zipser B, Professional Liability in Australia (2nd ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2007) 10–12; Saks M, Professions 




decisions – also puts forward relationships of trust and confidence, high levels of autonomy, 
significant levels of self-regulation by professional organisations and professed altruism53. In the 
modern multi-disciplinary Australian healthcare sector these qualities are no longer possessed by 
medicine alone, nor even by only the registered professions. In New South Wales and South Australia, 
where specific legislation on unregistered practitioners exists via a statutory Code of Conduct54, both 
codes contain statements that all practitioners must ‘provide health services in a safe and ethical 
manner’, which is described as practising within the scope of their knowledge and training, 
maintaining expertise and competence in their respective field, and only practising their service in the 
interests of their client. With national roll-out of a statutory Code of Conduct based on the New South 
Wales legislation imminent, many of the traits previously reserved for health occupations that were 
considered to be ‘professionals’ will – in theory – be expanded to new professions. 
 
However, whilst an exhaustively inclusive definition of who is now considered a ‘health profession’ 
encourages accountability of a broader range of health services, it brings with it its own complexities. 
An obvious example of the complexities and contradictions of trying to determine what is a health 
profession solely via traits based mechanisms is observed in one of Australia’s largest unregistered 
health practitioner groups – naturopaths. Naturopathy both fulfils and falls short of traditional traits-
based criteria. Although generally excluded from public health system, naturopaths have still 
managed to facilitate a significant role in the healthcare sector, with the discipline already achieved 
some degree of public professional recognition such as high public utilisation of their services55 and 
limited reimbursement by third-party payers56 (indicating some level trust and confidence). However, 
professional legitimacy in the eyes of the public is not, nor has not historically been, matched by 
institutional support for professional status. Previous government reports have derided naturopathy as 
a ‘minor cult system’ rather than a valid health discipline57, and there is significant support in the 
medical community to remove naturopathy from the university sector and insurance rebates for 
naturopathic services58 (indicating that such trust and confidence is not universal). To graduate as a 
naturopath now requires minimum of a four-year Bachelor degree59 (indicating an applied body of 
                                                 
53 Saks M, above n 52 at 12, Kerridge I et al, above n 36 at 117 
54 In New South Wales Public Health Act 2010 (NSW), s 100 empowers the Code; Public Health Regulation 
2012 (NSW), Sch 3 provides details of the Code of Conduct; In South Australia the relevant legislation is 
Health and Community Services Complaints Act 2004 (SA), s56  
55 In Australia, approximately 10% of the population regularly see a naturopath, rising to 16% in complex 
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learning) – more than many registered health professions – yet fragmentation and division within the 
profession– has made it almost impossible to develop national or consistent standards for training or 
practice within this profession (indicating that the body of learning is not consistent)60. The practices 
of naturopaths have also been assessed against naturopathic standards in both criminal and civil law 
(indicating some degree of legal recognition of naturopathic body of learning), though such 
assessment has not been limited to naturopathic standards alone (indicating that naturopathic 
standards alone are not recognised completely)61. There are few restrictions on naturopathic practice 
and approximately one –third of naturopathic patients use their naturopathic provider as a primary 
care practitioner (indicating autonomy)62, yet this autonomy only exists in the private health sector, 
and naturopaths have little authority in the public health care system. There are over 80 professional 
associations representing naturopaths63 (indicating failed attempts at adequate self-regulation) yet they 
are required to join a professional association in order to meet private health insurer or Therapeutic 
Goods Administration requirements and sales tax exemption related to their practice64 (indicating 
higher levels of collectivism and organisational development through professional association 
membership than most registered practitioner types).  
 
However, these complexities, which ordinarily would make classification as a ‘profession’ difficult, 
may be rendered moot by the fact that specific elements of legislation now explicitly recognise 
naturopaths (and other unregistered health occupations) as ‘health professionals’. Naturopathy, for 
example, is listed by the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations as a 
health profession at the highest level (Skill Level 1) under Minor Group 2 (‘Health Professionals’). 
Naturopaths are also recognised using the specific terminology ‘recognised professionals’ for sales 
tax exemption (with 21 other health occupations) under Section 38-10 of the A New Tax System 
(Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth). When developments such as these are considered with 
other developments, such as the extension of obligating traditional traits-based attributes of 
professions to all unregistered health occupations under negative licensing legislation implemented 
across Australia, and the changing role of statutory professional registration, it can be considered that 
the broad and vague terminology around health professions in civil liability legislation is not an 
oversight, but rather a deliberate attempt to allow the common law to evolve with the Australian 
health system, by allowing these provisions to not be solely restricted only to health practitioners 
specified in legislation, but to any health occupation which plays a significant role in the Australian 
healthcare system.  
 
Practice issues: what is standard and competent care? 
 
As discussed previously, trends in legislative definition of profession have expanded the potential use 
of the peer professional opinion defence considerably. Whilst this requirement is only explicitly stated 
in Queensland and Victorian legislation65, it is implicit in other State and Territory legislation. The 
broad remit of who is now classed as a ‘health professional’ under Australian legislation raises a 
number of issues. For example, commentators have noted that although these broad statutory 
definitions may help to explain to whom ‘peer professional opinion’ defences may apply (i.e. the 
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actual reach of civil liability legislation), they do little to inform how liability due to negligence may 
be determined. As the relevant peer professional opinion is that of the practitioners within the 
particular field of the dependent, the broadening of the definition of health professional adds further 
complexity, as now the courts must consider not only the traditional accepted standards of medical 
practice, but also the standards that should be applied to non-medical practitioners too. This is further 
complicated by the expansion of scope by many practitioners, whose contemporary standard practice 
may not reflect their traditional practice roles. The evolving and changing nature and scope of practice 
of health practice by specific disciplines is sometimes explicitly considered by judicial bodies and 
tribunals, though this is largely considered in the context of the suitability of practitioners to re-enter 
practice, or failure to maintain their practice skills66. 
 
Where health disciplines are part of a registered profession, the question around what is professional 
scope of practice is relatively clear. Guidelines, where they exist, could also provide evidence of 
professional peer opinion where the guidelines are supported by expert evidence as to the relevance in 
their particular case67.This replicates disciplinary protocols in non-medical health professions. For 
example, in cases where nurses have been brought before the tribunal to determine whether they have 
acted within their scope of practice, national competency standards developed by the Australian 
Nursing and Midwifery Council have been used to determine what scope of professional practice is68. 
However, utilising these guidelines do have some limitations even in circumstances of established 
practice, even beyond personal objections by practitioners, in that: as consensus documents they may 
not accurately reflect individual circumstances, they may be of inconsistent and variable quality or 
may provide minimum rather than reasonable standards69. For many new and emerging professions, 
they are also likely not to exist, requiring the court to make such judgment on other factors.    
 
The practice must be accepted in the Australian setting 
 
One of the further qualifications to Bolam suggested by the Ipp, and adopted by New South Wales, 
South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria70, is the requirement that the relevant peer opinion must be 
widely accepted in Australia. Whilst in relation to medical practice this provision was recommended 
to ensure that localised or overseas practices that did not have the support of the broader medical 
profession were not relied upon as evidence71, for new and emerging professions this may be 
problematic. Although overseas evidence could in this context be used to determine whether the 
practice was irrational or unreasonable (and could therefore theoretically garner similar court support 
as ‘professional peer opinion’), it is not admissible on the question of standard of care for the peer 
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professional opinion defence72. This means that overseas practices or treatments that are not yet 
supported locally, they would likely not qualify for the purposes of determining whether the 
practitioner has acted in accordance with standard and competent practice, and therefore the 
practitioner will have no remedy unless the prevailing peer opinion (not to incorporate such 
treatments) is deemed to be irrational. Whilst in the medical profession this may, potentially, raise 
problems in relation to the use of emerging or novel therapies, there are even greater ramifications for 
emerging professions, or for professions whose scope is expanding. For example, physician assistants 
are commonly utilised as independent primary care practitioners – with a duty of referral for more 
serious conditions – in countries such as the United States, but have only recently been implemented 
in Australia73. As such, there is little74 case law and few guidelines in Australia with which to guide 
what currently constitutes professional opinion. Moreover, as the professional community remains 
small, it may lack professional capacity and infrastructure and may be reliant on overseas sources 
(such as journals and conferences) to maintain and improve practice skills. In a small and emerging 
health profession there may be variable uptake of those skills learnt from overseas sources, 
particularly from early adopters (and perhaps perversely, from those most interested in improving 
standards of care by importing skills from countries where scope of practice has been more critically 
developed) and as such these may not be able to form professional peer opinion for the purposes of 
civil liability legislation.  
 
Wide acceptance and conflicting opinion 
 
The post-Ipp statutory standards impose further restrictions on the standard Bolam test, by requiring 
‘wide-acceptance’ and therefore excluding what Ipp described as ‘extreme views held by few experts’ 
or ‘rogue practitioners’75. By allowing for competent practice, it also ensures that non-evidence based, 
irrational or out-dated practices can be also be excluded at the court’s discretion. In new and emerging 
professions, or professions who are entering new fields of practice, it may be reasonable to expect 
conflicting expert evidence regarding both competence and widely accepted practice. In the case of 
Dobler v Halverson76 the Court of Appeal considered, amongst other matters, the operation of s 5O of 
the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) relating to standard of care for professionals. In his decision, Giles 
JA put forward a mechanism for consideration of conflicting expert evidence regarding competence 
and widely accepted practice. In this case, the respondent (Halverson) had suffered cardiac arrest and 
hypoxic brain damage (at the age of 18), and was discovered later to have suffered from Long QT 
Syndrome, a cardiac condition. The defendant (Dobler) was the respondent’s general practitioner. 
Dobler had been consulted during three of the respondent’s previous syncopal events (loss of 
consciousness), and had found a heart murmur in his examination of the respondent when he had 
presented for a migraine. Halverson’s case was that Dobler, taking into account the previous history, 
should have considered possible cardiac problems and referred for an electrocardiogram and 
consultation with a cardiologist. Dobler had appealed a previous ruling awarding the respondent 
damages, criticising (among other things) the judges reasoning on certain issues based on conflicting 
expert evidence. However, Giles JA stated that:  
 
“the question was not necessarily one of preferring A’s evidence of acceptable professional 
practice to the evidence of B. Rather, if B’s evidence supports the manner in which the 
defendant acted, the question was whether it established professional practice widely 
accepted by rational peer professional opinion. If both A and B gave their evidence as 
evidence of whether the manner in which the defendant acted accorded with professional 
practice widely accepted by rational peer opinion, the question will be one of preferring A’s 
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evidence to that of B, but otherwise it will be one of acceptance of B’s evidence, its weight 
and what it establishes.”77 
 
In other words, the onus was on all parties to not only show that the doctor acted competently, but 
also that the way in which the health professional acted was in line with accepted practice. If 
conflicting evidence does emerge and a higher appropriate standard is put forward as peer 
professional opinion, the court cannot rely on an expert’s own belief that the lower standard put 
forward is acceptable, but also satisfy the court that such a departure is widely accepted.       
 
Differing opinions may not just present themselves in court, but very different opinions may be within 
sub-elements of professions, or between academic and clinical opinion78. The English case De Freitas 
v O’Brien79 had demonstrated that even a small minority opinion may be considered valid peer 
professional opinion for determining accepted practice, if the body of opinion was ‘responsible’80. 
Although the post-Ipp statutory standards impose further restrictions on the standard Bolam test, by 
requiring ‘wide-acceptance’ and therefore excluding what Ipp described as ‘extreme views held by 
few experts’ or ‘rogue practitioners’81, the lack of specificity in defining health professions within the 
legislation would suggest that if a practice could be demonstrated as a rational and responsible 
subspecialty, it may only need to demonstrate wide acceptance within this subspecialty rather than the 
general field. This may In the Australian setting this was explored by the case Hawes v Holley82, 
where it was claimed that complications after bowel surgery could have been avoided with less 
aggressive pharmacological treatment: 
 
“…the two camps … would … be very disparate in size … the number of surgeons who were 
[not] enthusiastic advocates of [the drug] would be by several orders of  magnitude larger 
than those who espoused this treatment. If one looks at the literature on the [drug] treatment, 
the vast majority of it comes from physicians, medical doctors, not surgeons … and 
physicians of course are generally enthusiastic about pharmacological treatments. … there 
would be a wide body of surgical opinion that would not use [the drug] treatment.”83 
 
Ultimately the judge found, despite differing expert opinion, that the statutory standard was not 
required to be applied as there was common ground between both the physician and surgical 
communities that the drug should not have been used in certain circumstances. Although the trial 
judge did not indicate whether there was one relevant ‘field’ for the purposes of peer professional 
opinion to determine standard of care, he did comment that differing standards were acceptable to the 
court, provided that they fulfilled the criteria of being rational: 
 
“Finally, a comment should be made about the alleged "two camps" as to the use of 
neostigmine, the enthusiasts and the non-users. In present respects, I do not think anything 
relevantly turns on this. Pursuant to s 5O(1) of the Civil Liability Act a professional is not 
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negligent if it be established that the professional acted in a manner at the time which was 
widely accepted by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice. Sub-section 
(3) of the section acknowledges that there may be differing such opinions so that any one 
opinion may be relied upon as a defence to an action for negligence. Here, I am satisfied 
there are differing opinions about the use of neostigmine.”84   
 
It therefore also appears to be assumed that the relevant peer opinion is not limited to a defendant’s 
particular specialty or subspecialty and that it was sufficient if peer opinion in a related specialty 
would have regarded the defendant’s practice as competent practice, but not if the relevant peer 
opinion effectively imposes a different standard of care to the defendant’s profession85. Sappideen 
highlights this through the use of the example of a midwife, where negligence involving a home birth 
and the question is whether a midwife was negligent in allowing the second stage of labour to 
continue for too long, the relevant peer opinion would be that of midwives not obstetricians86. 
However, this would also be subject to the court deeming the treatment to be rational. 
 
Standards that are divergent from orthodox medical practice 
 
This may even ring true for unorthodox or unproven therapies, for which there is little (scientific) 
evidence and may reject conventional medical thought. In the English case of Shakoor v Situ87 Livesy 
J considered the question of whether the same principles applying to Western medical practitioners 
applied to practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine. In this case a widow of a patient sued a 
Chinese herbal medicine practitioner after her husband died after a course of herbal medicine 
treatment for benign lipomata. Although the herbal medicine treatment was, on balance, largely 
responsible for the patient’s death, it was held that this was most likely to have been an idiosyncratic 
reaction that the practitioner could not have foreseen. However, as part of his deliberation, Livesy J 
considered the professional standards to which a Chinese herbalist should be held. After considering 
whether an unorthodox therapist such as a Chinese herbalist should be held to the same standards as 
an orthodox medical practitioner, he disagreed, stating: 
 
"The Chinese herbalist, for example, does not hold himself out as a practitioner of orthodox 
medicine. More particularly, the patient has usually had the choice of going to an orthodox 
practitioner but has rejected him in favour of the alternative practitioner for reasons personal 
and best known to himself and almost certainly at some personal financial cost. Those 
reasons may include a passionate belief in the superiority of the alternative therapy or a fear 
of surgery or of reliance (perhaps dependence) on orthodox chemical medications which may 
have known undesirable side effects either short- or long-term or both.”88 
 
It should be noted, however, that Livesy J also noted that peer professional opinion was valid in 
Chinese medicine because, even though it may not be viewed as a legitimate therapy by many, it 
adequately demonstrated a body of knowledge, noting “unlike some alternative therapies, [traditional 
Chinese herbal medicine] has a long and distinguished history; it has an oral tradition extending back 
some 4,000 years or more and a written tradition extending back some 2,000 years”89. He did, 
however, hold that although the Chinese herbal medicine practitioner was not required to be held to 
the same standard of care as an orthodox practitioner, as part of the practitioner’s scope of practice “it 
will often be necessary to have regard to the fact that the practitioner is practising his art alongside 
orthodox medicine”90. This was taken to mean that the practitioner both needed to be familiar with 
medical literature pertaining to Chinese herbal medicine practice (such as adverse events or potential 
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interactions). These provisions are not unlike the provisions currently included in New South Wales 
and South Australian legislation relating to unregistered health practitioners, which requires that all 
unregistered health practitioners – including unorthodox practitioners – be held to the relevant 
standards within their professional group, but also require them to be familiar with orthodox medical 
literature and research on safety and ethics issues.  
 
Being held to other professional standards 
 
One possible exception to where a practitioner may be held to the standards of another profession is 
when that practitioner expands their scope of practice to take on tasks or practices that are largely 
performed by other professions. This issue was explored in the case Forder v Hutchinson91. In this 
case the appellant claimed that the respondent – an osteopath and naturopath – was negligent in 
failing to advise him of the risks associated with osteopathic manipulation of the neck and in the 
manner in which the respondent manipulated his neck, which he claimed resulted in vertebra-basilar 
ischaemic syndrome with resultant pain and suffering. In the initial judgement the trial judge had 
dismissed the claim on the basis that he was not satisfied on the evidence that the respondent’s 
conduct fell short of the standards of a competent osteopath. Among the principles considered was 
whether the expert evidence of a chiropractor was relevant to the practice of osteopathy.  
 
In the initial case, a Professor Terrett, a chiropractic academic from RMIT who taught chiropractic 
techniques to chiropractic, osteopathic and naturopathic students had been called as an expert witness 
and argued that the standard of care of the respondent fell short of accepted professional practice. The 
trial judge had dismissed the expert evidence of Professor Terrett, as not being relevant to the practice 
of osteopathy, stating that: 
 
"... I accept Professor Terre[t]t as being an expert in his field, which is chiropractic. The fact 
that some osteopathic students are lectured to by him does not make him an expert in 
osteopathy since he did not claim to lecture them in any osteopathic techniques or 
naturopathic techniques. It follows from that, I believe I can safely conclude that as much as 
Professor Terre[t]t does with osteopathic students to lecture them about chiropractic 
techniques, and where insofar as they might coincide at some points with osteopathy [sic]”92 
 
Nettle J claimed that this reasoning was erroneous, noting that chiropractic was a system of health 
care of which the principles treatment was spinal manipulation, whilst as osteopathy was a holistic 
approach to health care which embraced a range of treatments, including chiropractic treatment. 
Therefore, it was considered ‘self-evident’ that when the respondent manipulated the appellant’s neck, 
he was doing so as an osteopath using a chiropractic treatment. As an academic chiropractic 
practitioner who had taught chiropractic techniques to osteopathy students, it was held that there “was 
no dispute that Professor Terrett was qualified to express an opinion on chiropractic treatment by 
osteopaths”93. It should be noted, however, that this referred to whether the standard of practice was 
competent, not whether it formed accepted peer professional opinion. 
 
Potential Impact on professional liability 
 
Health disciplines expanding their scope of practice to take on roles once performed solely by medical 
professionals – though to a lesser extent other professions as well – will find exposure to potential 
liability increasing, due to the increased skill level required and the complexity of these tasks. 
Although increased exposure may add to the case law in this area, it will bring with it further 
problems for emerging and new professions. For some health disciplines such scope expansion may 
be not be sustainable, not due to their individual capability (or lack thereof) to perform these tasks, but 
due to the difficulties of non-medical professions to adequately and sustainably ensure liability 
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coverage. A poignant example of this is the Australian midwifery profession, which has had to have 
specific – though temporary – exclusions from the requirement that all registered health professions 
“maintain appropriate professional indemnity insurance” under Section 129(1) of the National Law94. 
Whilst hospitals have agreed to provide relevant coverage for hospital midwives, this has created 
difficulties for independent midwives – those midwives who work as sole practitioners in a business 
owned or operated by themselves or other midwives – in obtaining “appropriate” levels of insurance95. 
Although it is likely that insurers would be able to grant cover for the full scope of independent 
midwifery practice (though none currently do), risk analysis dictates that they are unable to do so at a 
price that would be practical or feasible for that profession96. Interim transitional arrangements have 
been developed which exclude midwives from this requirement97, though these arrangements are 
temporary. In this instance, withdrawal of this exclusion would not legally reduce the scope of 
independent midwifery services that could be provided competently by midwives, but they would 
have ‘real world’ scope reduction by virtue of the fact that such services would, likely, be rendered 
financially unviable. In such a scenario, some midwives may choose to continue to provide 
independent midwifery services either as midwives (or as unregistered birth attendants)98 without 
appropriate insurance arrangements in place. In these instances accepted professional standards under 
civil liability may not relate to whether the practitioner has the technical skills to practise the health 
service competently, but rather the failure of the practitioner to abide by relevant obligations to the 




One of the potential issues of expanded scope for health practitioners poses for the medical litigation 
is the hesitance of modern governments to expand regulatory arrangements for health practitioners. 
Historically, this may have limited who the term ‘professional’ may have applied to in relation to the 
provision of health services, yet legislative trends indicate that the term is increasingly used as an 
inclusive definition, bringing all persons who practice a health service via the application of a body of 
knowledge within the realms of civil liability legislation – a term more closely aligned perhaps with 
the previous use of ‘occupation’. For emerging or ‘unorthodox’ professions, however, the broad 
definition employed in the post-Ipp arena would seem to be inclusive enough to incorporate them, and 
therefore allow them to dictate their own standards, and when practitioners deviate from them. This 
would seem to be particularly relevant as Australian governments, beginning with New South Wales 
and South Australia100, also begin to target the health practice of unregistered practitioners through 
‘negative licensing’ arrangements such as statutory codes of conduct, which require a broad, 
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expansive and inclusive definition of ‘health professional’ to enable statutory authorities to have 
jurisdiction over unregistered practitioners. 
 
This broader definition may be create some complexities, as many new, emerging or unregistered 
professions have not undergone traditional professionalization pathways in which their body of 
knowledge has been codified and documented. However, even in these ‘professions’, the individual 
health profession have relative autonomy to define their accepted standards within their profession. 
However, these standards are influential, but not conclusive, in the post-Ipp modified Bolam test. 
However, legislation even for unregistered practitioners contains statements that all practitioners must 
‘provide health services in a safe and ethical manner’, which is described as practising within the 
scope of their knowledge and training, maintaining expertise and competence in their respective field, 
and only practising their service in the interests of their client. Moreover, the courts may reject 
professional opinion if it is considered to be irrational. Additionally, whilst individual professions do 
have autonomy in developing their own practice standards, it appears that all professions are required 
to consider safety and risk in similar frameworks. Therefore, whilst individual professions do have 
ultimate discretion in determining what a deviation from standard accepted, and even competent 
practice, the onus remains on experts, and the profession more generally, to demonstrate that this 
practice is rational. If they are unable to do so, even widely accepted professional practices are 
unlikely to serve as adequate defences in civil liability suits. 
 
